Yoopya with The Conversation
The death of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut on September 27 has left the militant Lebanese organisation leaderless at a critical time. Two days earlier in a speech broadcast around the world, the head of the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) northern command, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, had told his soldiers to prepare for a possible incursion into Lebanon.
There is every reason to believe Friday’s airstrike, which targeted Hezbollah’s headquarters building in the southern Beirut suburb of Dahiyeh, was in preparation for a possible incursion. It came after days of strikes which Israel claims have eliminated much of Hezbollah’s senior leadership.
Halevi told his troops on September 25 that they would “go in, destroy the enemy there, and decisively destroy” Hezbollah’s infrastructure. As Hezbollah is embedded within the Lebanese population, this strategy promises the deaths of innocent civilians.
Since 2006, both Hezbollah and the IDF have sought to avoid a direct confrontation. For years, they have played tit-for-tat with the rationale of proportionality to prevent an all-out war.
Although the horrific October 7 attacks on Israel by Hamas triggered a resumption of hostilities, until last week both sides were calling for restraint. What has changed? Is a ground invasion now inevitable? And if so, what would that mean for Hezbollah and Lebanon?
Israel has a track record of engaging in military adventures in Lebanon that have only ever served to make its opponents stronger in the long term. The destruction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) did not prevent the emergence of Hamas – indeed, it helped to create it. Similarly, Israel’s pursuit of the PLO in south Lebanon triggered the creation of Hezbollah. Despite five invasions since 1978, Israel has shown itself incapable of successfully occupying even the smallest sliver of Lebanese land.
While both sides have been preparing for a new conflict for years, the trigger for the escalation began on September 18, when Israel struck the first blow by detonating thousands of pagers and mobile devices owned by Hezbollah operatives, killing at least 32 and injuring several thousand people.
This technological attack had been years in the making and could be described as a strategic masterstroke to disable the enemy. The timing appears to have been because Hezbollah was becoming suspicious about the devices, so the IDF had to act or lose the “surprise”. This suggests operational considerations are taking precedence over strategic and political ones, which research suggests is rarely a good idea.
Nonetheless, these strikes are believed to have crippled Hezbollah’s command in the short term, and emboldened the IDF’s leadership. On September 18, Israel’s defence minister, Yoav Gallant, told Israeli troops: “We are at the start of a new phase in the war — it requires courage, determination and perseverance.” While he made no mention of the exploding devices, he praised the work of Israel’s army and security agencies, noting their results were excellent.
A tactic used in recent days by the IDF is one that has been developed over many years on the “Blue Line” – the de facto border that divides Israel and Lebanon. Emboldened by the failure of the IDF to defeat it in the July war of 2006, Hezbollah’s senior operatives have been active and visible on the Blue Line, which is monitored closely by the IDF.
This has enabled the IDF to photograph, identify and track senior Hezbollah leadership, which is why since October 7 we have seen a succession of assassinations of its key operatives, including Ibrahim Aqeel, a commander of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan force, and more recently, Mohammed Sarour in Beirut, as well as many others.
The IDF now believes it has Hezbollah on its knees – or at least, on one knee. The escalation we are currently witnessing is because the IDF is driving home its advantage and applying the same strategy as in Gaza: bombing any area it can plausibly claim to be a Hezbollah target.
This has had devastating consequences for the Lebanese population. The Health Ministry stated on Friday that 1,540 people had been killed since October 8 2023, with thousands of innocent civilians injured. Over 70,000 civilians have reportedly registered in 533 shelters across Lebanon, with an estimated 1 million people having been displaced from their homes.
Can Hezbollah fight back?
The death of Nasrallah has left Hezbollah temporarily leaderless, while the killing of several of its senior figures has deprived it of seasoned commanders, many of whom had recent combat experience in Syria. And the bombing of south Lebanon is reducing Hezbollah’s supply of rockets and other weapons.
However, Israel should not assume that Hezbollah is out of the game or underestimate the group. Hezbollah’s real strength has always lain in its ability to melt into the population – and it will be ready to commence a war of attrition with hit-and-run tactics if the IDF makes the mistake of putting boots on the ground again. The fact that all five previous invasions failed should be an indication that the outcome may be a repeat of what occurred between 1982 and 2006.
Furthermore, while Iran’s response to the escalation has been muted thus far, it is unlikely to abandon Hezbollah. A long, drawn-out, low-intensity conflict would favour the kind of asymmetric tactics used by the “axis of resistance”, which also includes Lebanon’s neighbour, Syria.
By bombing and displacing the Lebanese population, the IDF aims to reduce morale. It is now destroying private homes and public buildings on the grounds they are Hezbollah ammunition and weapons depots.
In Lebanon, the Palestine issue has always been regarded as the primary cause of the civil war that took place from 1975 to 1990. As such, the IDF is banking on Lebanese people turning against Hezbollah for bringing a new war down on them as a result of its rocket barrages into northern Israel, in solidarity with Hamas since the October 7 attack.
But, while there are many people in Lebanon who do not support Hezbollah and its activities in south Lebanon, the IDF should remember the past. Even if sentiment against Hezbollah is high today, indiscriminate bombing of the kind we are currently witnessing in Lebanon will not be tolerated by the population indefinitely.
It’s worth noting that in 1982, when the IDF invaded south Lebanon, some Lebanese welcomed them with rice and flowers – viewing them as liberators from the PLO. But that welcome did not last long.
In 2006, the IDF applied a similar strategy, targeting civilian evacuation convoys and UN compounds. And once again, the tide of public opinion swiftly swung back in favour of “al-muqawimah” (the resistance).
The stated IDF aim is to drive Hezbollah back north of the Litani river, to force it to comply with UN resolution 1701 and allow displaced people in northern Israel to return to their homes. But it is naive of Israel and the IDF to think that an invasion or a bombing campaign, no matter how successful in the short term, will enable Israeli civilians to live in peace along the Blue Line for the long term.
Ultimately, the only way forward is for both parties to come to the table and negotiate. The human cost of Israel’s current strategy in Lebanon is appalling to contemplate, and in all likelihood will create more hatred – fostering a new generation of anti-Israel fighters, rather than creating the basis for a durable peace.
Authors:
Vanessa Newby | Assistant Professor, Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University
Chiara Ruffa | Professor of Political Science, Sciences Po