Yoopya with The Conversation
Israel has announced it has killed Hamas military leader Yahya Sinwar in Gaza. Sinwar was apparently killed in a chance encounter on October 16 after a tank unit opened fire on a group of Palestinian men running into a building in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. His body was found in the rubble and later identified as the Hamas leader.
It’s an important moment in the conflict between Israel and Hamas. Sinwar’s death follows a campaign of assassination of top Hamas leaders by Israel since the latest round of hostilities began after the Hamas attack on Israel of October 7 2023.
Middle East analyst Scott Lucas of University College Dublin addresses some of the key issues raised by Sinwar’s killing.
How badly Sinwar’s death hit Hamas’s command structure?
Just over a year after its mass October 7 killings inside Israel, overseen by Yahya Sinwar, Hamas as an organisation is in disarray. It is not just the killing of Sinwar in the chance encounter with Israeli forces in Rafah. Sinwar’s death adds to a lengthy roll call of top Hamas leaders during the past year.
Principally, this includes Mohammed Deif, who planned the October 7 attacks, and Hamas’s political leader Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed in Beirut on July 31. These three are just the most prominent identities among a host of other senior officials and military commanders killed by Israel in Gaza or Lebanon.
Sinwar’s younger brother, Mohammed, 49, is likely to take over military command. And veteran figures such as Khaled Meshaal – who led Hamas’s political bureau from 1996 to 2017 – remain. But they will struggle to sustain the organisation, particularly if the Israeli government presses its military advantage and continues to identify and assassinate Hamas’s high command.
But that does not mean that Hamas as a movement is finished. Mass killing, even of its leaders, could galvanise it in the longer run. Those who survive will move up through the ranks, and the spirit of resistance and resentment could bring in more recruits.
Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, can claim “victory” over Sinwar, Haniyeh and Deif. But victory over Hamas, particularly if Israel pursues an open-ended occupation in Gaza, may not be assured.
What did Sinwar represent as a symbol of Palestinian resistance?
For many in Palestine and beyond, Sinwar will be hailed as a martyr and icon of resistance. He was with Hamas from its first years, spent 22 years in an Israeli prison, and took command in Gaza from 2017. He never wavered in his belief that Hamas would prevail over Israel’s blockade, detentions, and military operations.
But for others, Sinwar may be remembered as a divisive, even cruel figure. He built his career in Hamas on the killing of supposed “collaborators” with Israel. He was suspected of the torture and execution of rivals. And his leadership of the October 7 mass killings may be recalled as “resistance” which needlessly sacrificed the lives of tens of thousands and displaced almost 2 million of those whom he was supposedly representing.
Does his death clear the way for a younger generation more amenable to a ceasefire deal and the return of the hostages?
It will take months, perhaps years before we see where that “younger generation” will take Hamas. In the meantime, the interim political and military command of the battered organisation will face their immediate challenge. Can they still get some return, such as the freeing of Palestinians from Israeli prisons and the continued presence of Hamas in Gaza, in exchange for the release of the hostages? Or do they have to accept capitulation, possible expulsion, and Israeli occupation?
Barring an unexpected change in the US position, putting pressure on Netanyahu, all the cards are in Israel’s hand for now.
What’s Israel’s next move?
Ask Netanyahu. He has the option of proclaiming “mission accomplished”. However, that will not be true for many Israelis as long as the hostages are not returned. Without that resolution, Netanyahu will run the risk of losing power if forced to an election and even the resumption of court proceedings over bribery charges if he halts military operations.
Israel’s expansion of the war into Lebanon has improved his position to an extent. It has reconciled him with the defense minister, Yoav Gallant, who was privately saying Israel had no “endgame” in Gaza. And it has improved his approval ratings.
So it remains in his interest to continue hostilities in both Gaza and Lebanon. And indeed Netanyahu has signalled his intention to press on. But he has also said that while it is not the end, it is “the beginning of the end”.
While Netanyahu may pay lip service to the resumption of ceasefire talks, that will likely be conditional on the expulsion of Hamas from Gaza. And with no clear alternative for governance in the Strip, that points – as with the West Bank – to indefinite Israeli occupation.
How will Iran respond?
With the decimation of its Hamas and Hezbollah allies, Iran’s regime appears to have no good options at present. Amid economic and political problems at home and outmatched by Israel in military capabilities, the regime has avoided direct confrontation.
Iran could continue to pursue “indirect” war through militias in Iraq and Syria attacking US personnel with rockets and drones, or with Yemen’s Houthis lobbing missiles at Israel and again threatening Red Sea shipping. It could expand cyber-attacks and its own attempted assassinations abroad.
But those options would have little immediate effect, and would risk retaliation from the US and further isolation in the international community. The US is already using B-2 stealth bombers to attack Houthi bases in Yemen.
So for now, Iran’s leaders and their spokespeople are likely to take the political route, condemning Israel and proclaiming that the “axis of resistance” will be strengthened through its losses.
Can Washington now pressure Israel to do a deal with the Palestinians?
This is perhaps the easiest question to answer. Unless the US cuts military aid to Israel or comes out for an unconditional ceasefire, it has little if any leverage with Netanyahu.
How does this affect the US election campaign?
Foreign policy is rarely a priority for most US voters, and even the mass killing of the past year is unlikely to change that. But on the margins of the US presidential election, the escalating toll in Gaza and Lebanon could alienate Arab American voters from the Democrats in Michigan, one of the seven states that will decide the contest.
More broadly, the impression of Netanyahu pushing around a “weak” Biden administration could take hold. And in a toss-up election, those margins could be decisive.
Author:
Scott Lucas | Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin